

Evaluation of the Policy on the Registration and Structuring of Civil Society Organizations in Pandeglang Regency

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Abstract

The rapid growth in the number of civil society organizations (CSOs) known locally as *ormas* in Pandeglang Regency has not been matched by administrative orderliness or official registration, thereby complicating local government oversight efforts. This study aims to evaluate the implementation of policies regarding CSO registration and management in Pandeglang Regency, as well as to analyze the factors that hinder or support this process. A descriptive qualitative research method was employed. Data collection involved in-depth interviews, observation, and document analysis at the Pandeglang Regency National Unity and Politics Agency (Kesbangpol), with informants comprising government officials, CSO administrators, and community leaders. The findings indicate that the implementation of CSO registration policies has not been optimal. Key obstacles identified include limited human resources for oversight, weak inter-agency coordination, and low legal awareness among CSO administrators regarding registration obligations. The study highlights the need to digitize the registration system and increase the frequency of periodic guidance and supervision. In conclusion, the management of CSOs in Pandeglang Regency requires service system reform and the strengthening of local regulations to foster more transparent and accountable organizational governance.

Keywords: *Policy Evaluation, CSO Registration, Organizational Management, Pandeglang*

Introduction

Freedom of association, assembly, and expression constitutes a constitutional right guaranteed under Article 28E, Paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Within the context of national life, civil society organizations (*ormas*) play a crucial role as a bridge for articulating public aspirations and as strategic government partners in accelerating national development (Wasisto et al., 2022). The legal framework for maintaining a healthy organizational environment is embodied in Law Number 16 of 2017 concerning Civil Society Organizations, which mandates an integrated system for reporting, registration, and administrative management to ensure the legal mapping of these organizations (Amer, 2020).

At the level of regional autonomy, the governance of civil society organizations should ideally be grounded in the principles of transparency, legal compliance, and sectoral accountability. The National Unity and Politics Agency (Kesbangpol) at the

regency level plays a central role as the lead agency responsible for processing registrations—specifically the issuance of the Certificate of Registration (SKT)—and fostering strategic partnerships (Sinaga & Mustafa, 2021). By utilizing a structured and periodically verified database of these organizations, local governments should be able to optimize oversight functions, detect potential horizontal conflicts, and effectively channel empowerment programs or regional grants to create a stable and conducive regional environment (Winata, 2018).

However, empirical realities in Pandeglang Regency reveal a stark gap between normative regulations and policy implementation on the ground. Monitoring data indicates a significant surge in the number of civil society organizations in Pandeglang Regency, yet this growth has not been matched by a corresponding commitment to administrative compliance among organizational leaders (Nurdin, 2023). Many local civil society organizations (CSOs) operate actively within the community from a sociological standpoint; however, legally, their registration status with the Pandeglang National and Political Unity Agency (Kesbangpol) has expired or is non-existent, creating a regulatory gap in local administrative oversight (Suradi, 2019).

This administrative disorder and weak regulatory management have adverse implications for the effectiveness of public policy in Pandeglang Regency. The proliferation of "nameplate" CSOs—which appear only seasonally during practical political events or prior to local grant budget submissions—demonstrates the inadequacy of factual field validation. The Pandeglang Kesbangpol faces significant challenges in verifying valid secretariat locations and legitimate leadership structures; consequently, organizational guidance processes become skewed and inaccurate, creating a vulnerability to vertical and horizontal conflicts that disrupt local security stability.

Previous studies evaluating CSO policies have generally focused on the dynamics of dissolving radical CSOs at the national level or on macro-level ideological conflicts following the enactment of the new Law on Civil Society Organizations (Mahdi, 2017; Anwar & Shidiq, 2021). Other research has merely examined Kesbangpol's guidance functions from a descriptive perspective, failing to link them to the effectiveness of oversight instruments in remote areas (Pratama, 2020; Hadi, 2022). While most literature explores organizational management within the context of major cities that are digitally advanced, there is a notable lack of research specifically examining administrative governance anomalies among CSOs in regions characterized by vast geography and fiscal constraints.

This is where the novelty of this research lies. The study focuses specifically on evaluating the policy regarding the registration and regulation of civil society organizations (CSOs) in Pandeglang Regency—a region characterized by strong socio-religious dynamics yet facing serious challenges related to bureaucratic modernization and the limited reach of supervisory officials. Rather than merely examining the administrative aspects of document reporting, this research analyzes the structural failures of government bodies in exercising substantive oversight in the field, as well as the cultural responses of local CSO leaders to these formal legal requirements.

Based on this background and problem identification, this article aims to conduct an in-depth analysis of the effectiveness of CSO registration policy implementation and

to identify the determinants influencing the regulation of civil society organizations in Pandeglang Regency. By employing a public policy evaluation approach, the study seeks to make a theoretical contribution to the field of public administration, particularly regarding local institutional governance. From a practical standpoint, the article offers strategic recommendations for the Pandeglang Regency Government to reform its CSO oversight system, thereby fostering an ecosystem.

Method

This study employs a qualitative approach with a descriptive method to evaluate the policy regarding the registration and regulation of civil society organizations in Pandeglang Regency. The research focuses on the Pandeglang Regency National Unity and Politics Agency (Kesbangpol) as the responsible authority (Moleong, 2018). Data were collected through in-depth interviews, field observations, and a review of relevant regulations and agency performance reports. Informants were selected using purposive sampling, involving Kesbangpol Pandeglang officials and representatives from civil society organization leadership. Data analysis utilized the interactive model proposed by Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña (as cited in Sugiyono, 2022), comprising the stages of data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification. To ensure the validity and credibility of the findings, the researcher employed source triangulation and methodological triangulation. Triangulation was achieved by cross-referencing information between local government officials and civil society organization representatives, as well as by reconciling interview results with facts derived from formal documents and actual field observations.

Result and Discussion

Implementation Realities and Administrative Hurdles in Civil Society Organization Registration

The growth of civil society organizations (CSOs)—or ormas—in Pandeglang Regency reflects significant local-level sociological dynamics. Data obtained from the Pandeglang Regency National Unity and Politics Agency (Kesbangpol) indicates a substantial surge in the number of registered organizations over the past five years. This growth spans various clusters, ranging from religious and youth organizations to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and regional cultural associations. Theoretically, this massive volume suggests a high level of active citizen participation in regional development.

However, field research findings reveal that this numerical surge does not correlate with legal compliance or administrative orderliness. Document verification shows that the majority of CSOs operating in Pandeglang Regency are either illegal or administratively inactive. Many organizations have allowed the validity of their Registration Certificates (SKT) or their legal entity status—issued by the Ministry of Law and Human Rights—to expire years ago. CSO administrators tend to neglect their obligations regarding re-registration or reporting changes in organizational structure to the local government.

This administrative disorder has given rise to the phenomenon of "nameplate CSOs" (*ormas papan nama*) across various districts in Pandeglang. This term refers to organizations that are legally registered on paper and possess a secretariat sign, yet engage in no real activity within the community. Such organizations are difficult to map because their operations are merely seasonal. Field investigations confirm that these passive CSOs typically surface abruptly during local political events or when the window for regional grant applications opens.

Another equally serious administrative hurdle is the inconsistency regarding domiciles and the lack of permanent secretariat offices for the majority of local CSOs. During field inspections, the oversight team from the Pandeglang Regency National Unity and Politics Agency (Kesbangpol) frequently encounters secretariat addresses that are either fictitious or have been repurposed. This ambiguity regarding physical domicile stems from the common practice among mass organization (*ormas*) administrators of using the private residence of the elected chairperson or secretary as the official office address; consequently, whenever the leadership structure changes, the organization's address shifts as well, often without any official notification to the relevant authorities.

Internally, Kesbangpol Pandeglang faces structural capacity constraints, specifically a shortage of human resources dedicated to the oversight of mass organizations. The number of personnel allocated for factual verification and guidance is disproportionate to the hundreds of organizations spread across 35 districts. This staffing limitation causes oversight functions to stall, often reducing them to mere formalities. Officials lack the time and capacity to visit each organization's secretariat individually to verify the authenticity of leadership documentation.

Beyond personnel shortages, operational challenges are exacerbated by meager budget allocations for programs aimed at overseeing and regulating mass organizations. Pandeglang Regency's limited regional budget compels Kesbangpol to prioritize macro-level political stability and the management of immediate conflicts. Consequently, agendas such as periodic field verifications, the dissemination of regulations at the district level, and the procurement of effective monitoring tools are frequently sidelined or underfunded.

The regency's vast geography – dominated by rural and hilly terrain – presents a distinct challenge to policy implementation. Difficult transportation access to remote areas in southern Pandeglang hinders coordination and the monitoring of organizations at the grassroots level. Many small-scale local organizations flourish in these interior regions without ever receiving information on government regulations, leading them to operate independently, unaware of the legal obligation to register.

This study also found that the registration system currently implemented by the Pandeglang Regency National Unity and Politics Agency (Kesbangpol) still relies on conventional, paper-based methods. Representatives of civil society organizations (CSOs) wishing to register are required to physically bring stacks of documents to the agency's headquarters in the regency capital. This manual, bureaucratic procedure is a source of complaint for CSOs based in remote areas, as they incur significant transportation costs and spend a great deal of time simply handling initial registration formalities.

The absence of an integrated digital database (a unified CSO data system) represents the most significant weakness in administrative governance within Pandeglang Regency. Kesbangpol lacks an electronic information system capable of automatically updating CSO activity status in real-time. CSO registration records are still stored as physical documents in filing cabinets, leaving them vulnerable to damage or loss. This situation complicates data retrieval when other agencies or the public require valid information regarding a CSO's track record and legal status.

The direct impact of this flawed data management system is evident in the distribution and oversight of regional grants and social assistance funds. Legal loopholes have been identified that allow CSOs with expired legal status—or those that are unregistered—to successfully secure grant funding from the local government. These administrative irregularities occur because the document verification process at the Regional Financial and Asset Management Agency (BPKAD) is not digitally integrated with the legal status database maintained by Pandeglang's Kesbangpol.

Furthermore, the periodic reporting function mandated by law for all registered CSOs is entirely non-functional in Pandeglang Regency. Regulations require every CSO to submit organizational progress reports and annual financial statements to the local government. However, document audits reveal that compliance with these periodic reporting requirements is extremely low, bordering on zero percent. The absence of firm and consistent administrative sanctions from the local government means CSOs feel no moral or legal obligation to comply with these rules. Overall, the reality of implementing policies for the registration and regulation of mass organizations in Pandeglang Regency remains trapped in a vicious cycle of passive and inaccurate administration. The local government only processes data on these organizations when faced with conflict-related complaints or requests for budget disbursement; outside of such instances, the management of these groups is left to drift without direction. This bleak picture of administrative management underscores that the regulations governing the registration of mass organizations in Pandeglang Regency have yet to transform into an effective instrument of social oversight capable of fostering accountable local governance..

Analysis of Structural and Cultural Factors and Governance Solutions

An analysis of the administrative disarray regarding civil society organizations (CSOs) in Pandeglang Regency reveals that the failure to implement this policy cannot be viewed merely as a technical issue. Theoretically, this suboptimal performance is rooted in the structural dimensions of the local government bureaucracy, which remain fragmented and characterized by sectoral parochialism. While the National Unity and Political Agency (Kesbangpol) of Pandeglang Regency is positioned as the spearhead of oversight, in practice, it operates without integrated system support from other technical agencies. Weak inter-agency working relationships have caused registration regulations to lose their legal enforcement power at the local level.

This institutional coordination weakness is clearly evident in the mechanisms for distributing grants and social assistance funded by the Regional Budget (APBD). Technical agencies—such as the Social Affairs Agency, the Youth and Sports Agency, and the Public Welfare Division—often bypass the requirement for Kesbangpol to verify legal

compliance before disbursing aid. Consequently, CSOs with poor administrative records still receive financial legitimacy from the state. This structural loophole indirectly fosters the existence of illegal CSOs and undermines the primary function of the Certificate of Registration (SKT) as an instrument of social control.

From a human resource management perspective, the limited number of oversight personnel at Kesbangpol Pandeglang reflects a mismatch between field workloads and institutional capacity. Pandeglang's vast geography, comprising 35 districts, necessitates a decentralized oversight model rather than one centralized at the regency capital. Faced with a shortage of civil servants and inadequate operational budgets, officials in charge tend to take shortcuts by adopting a passive service approach. The bureaucracy acts merely as a "document recorder" rather than an "active facilitator and overseer." Beyond structural bureaucratic hurdles, resistance to this policy is further compounded by cultural barriers deeply rooted in the ecosystem of local civil society organizations (CSOs) in Pandeglang. Grassroots organizational culture remains dominated by a short-term pragmatic orientation. CSO administrators often view formal legal status not as a legal obligation to uphold public accountability, but merely as a "bureaucratic ticket" to access local economic resources. When there is no immediate prospect of securing grants or a platform for practical politics, the cultural motivation to update leadership records and report organizational activities evaporates.

The negative perception held by CSO administrators regarding the complexity of conventional, paper-based registration bureaucracy also reinforces their reluctance to comply with legal requirements. The significant geographical distance between southern Pandeglang and the regency's administrative center imposes high transaction costs on rural CSOs. From a socio-psychological perspective, when administrative procedures are perceived as resource-intensive and time-consuming without offering clear functional benefits, civil society actors opt for informal pathways. They continue to operate sociologically on the ground while disregarding the state's formal legal framework.

Therefore, overcoming the impasse in implementing the policy for regulating CSOs in Pandeglang Regency requires a paradigm shift in local governance. The control-oriented approach—previously purely administrative, top-down, rigid, and often repressive—must be transformed into a participatory and collaborative approach focused on guidance and support. The local government must position CSOs not as objects of suspicion subject to surveillance, but as strategic partners in development. This shift in perspective is crucial to breaking down the wall of mistrust separating bureaucratic circles from local civil society groups.

A tactical and urgent step for the Pandeglang Regency Government is to accelerate bureaucratic reform by digitizing the CSO registration system (specifically, through the implementation of an "e-ormas" application). This integrated digital transformation will eliminate the manual procedural steps that have been a source of public complaint. Representatives of civil society organizations in remote areas will no longer need to travel long distances to submit physical files; instead, they can simply upload the required documents via the online system. This digitalization will automatically reduce transaction costs and overcome the geographical challenges posed by Pandeglang's vast territory.

Implementing an *e-ormas* (electronic civil society organization) system addresses the lack of an accurate, unified database for oversight officials. This web-based information system can be designed to send automated notifications to organization administrators six months before their Registration Certificates (SKT) expire. Furthermore, this digital database must be accessible and integrated in real-time with budget verification systems at the Regional Financial and Asset Management Agency (BPKAD) and relevant social affairs agencies. Such data interconnection instantly closes loopholes for administrative manipulation and prevents regional funds from reaching fictitious or illegal organizations.

Alongside digital system improvements, law enforcement must be strengthened through stricter local regulations, such as a new Regent's Regulation outlining guidelines for the guidance and supervision of civil society organizations. These regulations must include clauses for progressive and consistent administrative sanctions—ranging from the suspension of partnership rights and the blocking of grant access to recommendations for dissolution—for organizations that violate public order or neglect annual reporting obligations. Firm, impartial enforcement of sanctions is essential to restore the authority of the law and create a deterrent effect for non-compliant organizations.

Ultimately, the success of evaluating policies regarding the registration and management of civil society organizations in Pandeglang Regency hinges on the region's ability to create a healthy ecosystem of partnership incentives. The local government can offer rewards—such as active involvement in self-managed village development projects—to organizations with a clean track record of administrative and financial governance. By integrating the convenience of digital systems, the firmness of structural sanctions, and productive cultural incentives, the governance of civil society organizations in Pandeglang can transform into a more transparent, independent, and accountable environment.

Conclusion

The implementation of policies regarding the registration and regulation of civil society organizations (CSOs) in Pandeglang Regency has not been optimal due to a clash between structural bureaucratic obstacles and cultural resistance from the organizations themselves. Structurally, the Pandeglang Regency National Unity and Politics Agency (Kesbangpol) faces constraints such as limited supervisory personnel, insufficient operational budgets, and the absence of an integrated digital database, all of which weaken supervisory functions and field-based factual verification. Culturally, the low level of legal awareness among CSO administrators regarding the renewal of formal legal status stems from short-term pragmatic views and the high transaction costs associated with conventional bureaucracy; this has led to a proliferation of inactive and unregistered CSOs. To address these issues, the Pandeglang Regency Government is advised to accelerate service reform by digitizing the CSO registration system (e-ormas) to overcome geographical barriers and provide a single, valid dataset for relevant agencies. Furthermore, the local government needs to strengthen law enforcement through firm local regulations and consistent administrative sanctions for organizations that violate the rules. This control-oriented approach should be combined with productive

partnership incentives to shift the mindset of local CSOs, encouraging them to voluntarily adopt orderly, transparent, and accountable organizational governance.

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